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outline



Introduction

Past, present and lessons learned

Future – unpredictable?

Conclusions




introduction



Ericsson psirt

- Product Security Incident Response Team
- > No internal IS/IT network supervision and incidents
- No mobile terminals and mobile malware
- Yes operator mobile networks, globally





Incident environment for us - past

- PSIRT receives filtered view of security incidents from operators
- A case typically starts as
 - "ordinary issue" reported to Ericsson support
 - fraud case
- Most cases related to (lack of) operational security as of today



Past, present & lessons learned



Case examples



Case 1: A-number spoofing

Case 2: Free surfing

Case 3: Prepaid fraud

Lessons learned



Case 1: A-number spoofing

- Voicemail eavesdropping or fake SMS messages by spoofing the A-number
- Most often resolved with proper configuration and number analysis in telecom networks





Case 2: Free surfing

- Bypass charging rules for 3G mobile networks
- Surf free of charge in the Internet
- How does it work?
 - Use a proxying tool installed on the laptop
 - Exploit zero-rated URLs to bypass charging rules
 - Modify http headers to reflect both 0-rated URL and full URL of the site to be visited
 - E.g. <u>www.operator_x.com.www.t9space.com</u>
- How to mitigate?
 - Proper configuration rules for mobile data networks



Case 3: free calls, prepaid fraud

- Prepaid (roaming) customers making free calls
- Prepaid balance credits
- Insiders involved taking illegitimate actions
 - Leaked passwords and group accounts
 - Segregation of duties does not exist
- How to mitigate?
 - Enforce good user and password policies
 - Good fraud management system
 - Logging activated



Lessons learned


- Main motivation as of today: free calls, free surfing
- 90% of cases related to (lack of) operational security
- Insufficient security policies
 - user account handling
 - segregation of duties
 - password policies
- Logging and accountability not detailed enough
- > Evidence often destroyed during re-starts
- Communication with other parties during incident investigation may be challenging



Future – un predictable?



FUTURE SCENARIOS





Conclusions



New challenges ahead

From one symptom to patterns and scenarios – wide attack surface

Get out of the silo

Lack of operational security will still be main reason for incidents

Co-operation across countries, legal regions and organizations crucial





Questions?





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